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Hood's Understated Alteration of the
Eleventh Amendment Landscape
Leonard H. Gerson1

In May of last year, the United States Supreme Court in Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,2 for the first time recognized an
Article I exception to its broad statement of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida.3 In an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a critical bankruptcy exception was4 established by a 7-2 vote with hardly a mention of Seminole Tribe.
By joining the majority and thereby having the right to author the
Court's opinion, the Chief Justice was able to minimize the significance of the change brought about by Hood. The Rehnquist Court's
prior claim that Congress lacks the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under Article I now has a hollow ring. In contrast to its
indefensibly broad statement of state sovereign immunity in Seminole
Tribe, the Court recognized in Hood that a state's sovereign immunity
is subordinate to Congress's exercise of the bankruptcy power in the
discharge of a debt owed to a state.
1. Attorney, Angel & Frankel, P.C., New York. Mr. Gerson represented Pamela Hood before
the United States Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. He also represented
the Business Bankruptcy Law Committee of the New York County Lawyers' Association before
the Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal as an amicus curiae in
support of the constitutionality of section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of his
firm or the Business Bankruptcy Law Committee.
2. 124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004).
3. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). A state's sovereign immunity of which the Eleventh Amendment is a
reflection, bars a non-consenting state from being sued by a private party. Although Seminole
Tribe involved the Indian Commerce Clause, the opinion broadly states in dictum that Congress
cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to any of its Article I powers. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
4. In Hood the debtor commenced an adversary proceeding to obtain an "undue hardship"
discharge of her $4,169.31 in student loans. The Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (the
"TSAC"), which was a guarantor of the loans moved to dismiss on the basis of its sovereign
immunity. The bankruptcy court, bankruptcy appellate panel and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the TSAC's claim; they ruled that the TSAC's sovereign immunity was abrogated under section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, nothwithstanding the dicta in Seminole
Tribe, which seemingly barred such an exercise of Congressional power.
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The Court attempted to accomplish this change in the law unobtrusively by simply declaring that the discharge of a student loan debt,
the matter at issue in Hood, did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment.5 Drawing on the in rem tradition that defined a bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act, the Court ruled that
"the court's jurisdiction [with respect to the debt] is premised on the
debtor and his estate;" thus, there was no assertion of any personal
6
jurisdiction over the state.
The Court reasoned that since there was no assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a state, it could avoid the "broader question" for
which certiorariwas granted: whether the Bankruptcy Clause "grants
Congress -the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private suits."' 7 Nevertheless, for the first time since Seminole Tribe, the
Court in Hood determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not
generally bar a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a non-consenting
state in a suit brought by a private party.
In addition to the historically recognized in rem character of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the Court in Hood relied upon its prior recognition of a limited in rem exception to state sovereign immunity in
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.8 Deep Sea Research, however,
involved admiralty law, an Article III area not addressed in Seminole
Tribe. In contrast, Hood involves an Article I power, the heart of the
Seminole Tribe opinion.
Hood's recognition of a bankruptcy in rem exception is simply not
reconcilable with the majority's claim-in Seminole Tribe that "there is
no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of... [the bankruptcy laws] against the States." 9 Similarly,
the Court's assertion in Seminole Tribe that it "never has awarded relief against a State" under the bankruptcy laws, 10 if ever defensible,
appears even more strained after its opinion in Hood.
DEFINITION OF THE IN

REM

EXCEPTION

In Deep Sea Research, the Court limited the case's Eleventh
Amendment exception to admiralty actions in which a state does not
have possession of the vessel. No comparable definition of the extent
or limits of the bankruptcy in rem exception is found in Hood. Thus,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Hood, 124 S.Ct. at 1909.
Id. at 1910.
Id. at 1908-09.
523 U.S. 491 (1998).
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16.

10. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist was able to frame an opinion which imposed
new limits on the breadth of a state's sovereign immunity without creating any clear rule, which might have proven even more destructive
to a state's Eleventh Amendment rights.
The Court avoided that result by stating in a footnote that no definition of this in rem exception to a state's sovereign immunity was required, because the exercise of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in the
discharge of a student loan "is not an affront to the sovereignty of the
State."'" However, the Court was quick to note that it was not holding "that every exercise of a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction will
not offend the sovereignty of the State.' 2 As Justice Thomas rightly
observes in his dissent, there is "no principle in the Court's opinion to
distinguish this case from any other" exercise of a bankruptcy court's
in rem jurisdiction. 13 Instead, the majority in Hood simply offered a
few examples of what exercises of a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction would be acceptable. Thus, adding to the very difficult task of
defining what matters comprise a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction, Hood imposes the additional burdenof divining what exercises
of such in rem jurisdiction involving a state would violate the Eleventh
Amendment.
In order to know with finality whether a bankruptcy court's exercise
of a particular in rem power is free from Eleventh Amendment constraints, Hood's vagueness requires that one examine whether that
power was specifically addressed in the text of the opinion. A bankruptcy court's discharge of a debt owed to a state or the sale of a
debtor's property free and clear of the lien of a state are the only two
areas, which the majority in Hood explicitly identifies as falling within
14
the in rem exception.
What is most surprising is the absence from Hood of any clear example of what exercises of a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction
would be barred. There is some suggestion in its references to its
prior opinions in United States v. Nordic Viii. Inc.' 5 and Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maint.' 6 that the recovery of a money
judgment against a state would be excluded from Hood's in rem exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, 17 but there is no clear
statement of that proposition. The absence of such an express limita11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Hood, 124 S.Ct. at 1913 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 1920.
Id. at 1911, 1912.
503 U.S. 30 (1992).
492 U.S. 96 (1989).
See Hood, 124 S.Ct. at 1911.
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tion is particularly significant, because in Nordic Village the Court explicitly stated: "[W]e have never applied an in rem exception to the
sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recovery, and have suggested that no such exception exists.""' No comparable prohibition
against money judgments is contained in Hood. Moreover, one week
after the opinion in Hood was issued, -the Court denied certiorariin
another Sixth Circuit bankruptcy case in which the abrogation of a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity was affirmed in an action for a
19,2 0
tax refund.
Hood states that in personam jurisdiction would be required to enforce the Bankruptcy Code's section 524(a)(2) discharge injunction
against a state, 2 1 but the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity could be used to protect a debtor against such
a violation. 2 2 Given the breadth of the definition of property of a
debtor's estate in section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the absence of any statement in Hood that a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction is defined by the limits of such jurisdiction under the former
Bankruptcy Act, Hood arguably grants a bankruptcy court extremely
wide latitude in issuing orders that would affect a state's interest.
While the Court in Hood, at least on its face, was able to sidestep
the conflict between allowing a bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a
non-consenting state and the broad statement of state sovereign immunity in Seminole Tribe, it could not avoid the fact that Hood was an
adversary proceeding, an action commenced by service of a summons
and complaint. As recognized in Hood itself, the Court in Seminole
Tribe had made service of process an independent basis for recognizing the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment in order to prevent a
state from suffering the indignity of being hauled into court. 23 The
Court in Hood overcame this obstacle by ruling that because the
18. Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 38.
19. See Comm'r of Revenue v. H.J. Wilson Co., 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). The Sixth Circuit's
opinion in H. J. Wilson simply adopts its sister panel's analysis in Hood.
20. At the end of the majority opinion in" Hood, there also is a suggestion that preference
actions would not be encompassed by a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction. Hood, 124 S.Ct.
at 1914. This observation came as no surprise, as this issue was alluded to by Chief Justice
Rehnquist at oral argument. As recognized by the Chief Justice, preference actions, unlike other
core bankruptcy proceedings, were adjudicated in the district court rather than in the bankruptcy
court under the former Bankruptcy Act. Tr. of Oral Argument in Hood, 2004 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 16 at *33.
21. Hood, 124 S.Ct. at 1911 n.4.
22. See, e.g., Ellett v. Goldberg, 254 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2002) (Seminole Tribe does not bar use of Ex parte Young exception against state official who
violates discharge injunction).
23. Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1914.
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bankruptcy court's power arose from its in rem jurisdiction, service of
24
process was not of constitutional import in the case. Instead, it simply was a product of the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6).
Such a procedural requirement, the Court reasoned, should not "be
given dispositive weight,"2 5 particularly as 28 U.S.C. § 2075 explicitly
provides that the Bankruptcy Rules should not alter any substantive
right granted under the Bankruptcy Code.
This willingness to overlook service of process against a non-consenting state was the most prominent objection in Justice Thomas's
dissenting opinion in Hood. However, rather than being hostile to the
majority's understanding of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, Justice
Thomas recognized that an in rem exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity may be appropriate. Justice Thomas wrote:
I do not contest the assertion that in bankruptcy, like admiralty,
there might be a limited in rem exception to state sovereign immunity from suit. Nor do I necessarily reject the argument that this
proceeding could have been resolved by motion without offending
the dignity of the State., However, because this case did not proceed
the merits based solely upon what might
by motion, I cannot resolve
26
occur.
not,
did
have, but
Ironically, the great significance accorded to service of process in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is reflected in the post-Seminole
Tribe bankruptcy cases cited by the majority in Hood. Prior to Hood,
when circuit courts of appeal sought to insulate bankruptcy from the
full implications of the Seminole Tribe doctrine, the test often used to
determine whether the Eleventh Amendment governed was (i)
whether a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction was applicable, and
(ii) whether service of process against a non-consenting state was involved. Thus, the three circuit court of appeals cases which the majority in Hood cited for the proposition that a bankruptcy court's power
to discharge a debt arose from its jurisdiction over the debtor and its
estate, rather than personal jurisdiction over a state, were opinions in
was no adversary proceedwhich the circuit courts stressed that there
27
involved.
ing (summons and complaint)
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1918.
27. See In re Ellett, 254 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (a
non-consenting state may be bound by chapter 13 discharge order, which discharges pre-petition
state income tax claim); In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 930 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1073 (2000) (Eleventh Amendment did not bar bankruptcy court ruling that bail bond debt not
exempted from discharge under section 523(a)(7)); Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 822 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999) (a non-consenting state may be bound by order dis-
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These circuit courts' reliance upon the fact that an action was not
commenced with service of process was never sustainable. 28 Nor was
these circuit courts' reliance upon the Supremacy Clause justifiable. 29
The decision in Hood eliminates the need for false claims of
supremacy based upon Article VI. Instead, the Court in Hood rightly
found the requisite supremacy in the bankruptcy power itself. These
circuit courts recognized that a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to discharge a debt should not be controlled by Seminole Tribe. In Hood
the Court affirmed that view and eliminated the contradictions required by Seminole Tribe.
THE SEMINAL CHANGE FROM SEMINOLE TRIBE

The opinion in Seminole Tribe was notable for its unqualified subordination of Congress's Article I powers to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court wrote:
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. 30
After Hood such a statement must be accompanied with a wink; it can
no longer be said that the Eleventh Amendment trumps Congress's
bankruptcy power under Article I.
At the very least a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a non-consenting state is no longer solely defined by Seminole Tribe, assuming it
ever was. Hood means that bankruptcy courts have the power to issue
decisions which alter the legal rights of a non-consenting state. 31
The Supreme Court precedent relied upon in Hood could easily
have been distinguished., For example, Justice Thomas observed in his
dissent in Hood that in the two cases relied upon by the majority, New
York v. Irving Trust Co. 32 and Van Huffel v. Harkelrode,33 the Court
did not "attempt to undertake a sovereign immunity analysis. ' 34
charging claims for breach of contract and conversion against chapter 7 debtor) (cited in Hood at
1910-1911).
28. See Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity:

Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 19-20 (2000) [hereinafter A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity].

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1917.
288 U.S. 329 (1933).
284 U.S. 225 (1931).
Hood, 124 S.Ct. at 1919.
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Moreover, in expanding the breadth of Eleventh Amendment immunity in Alden v. Maine35 to encompass actions in state court, the Court
had distinguished much more powerful precedent in reaching its desired outcome. Finally, as also observed by Justice Thomas, the Court
previously stated in Missouri v. Fiske36 that "'the fact that a suit in a
federal court is in rem or quasi in rem, furnishes no ground for the
issue of process against a non-consenting State."' 37 In total, the
Court's opinion in Hood reflects a decision not to allow an essential
requirement of the bankruptcy system - jurisdiction over a non-consenting state - to be sacrificed in furtherance of the Seminole Tribe
ideal.
Such policy concerns, however, are absent from the text in Hood.
In oral argument, the question of how a bankruptcy court would be
able to discharge a debt if Tennessee's position were upheld, was a
repeated refrain in the questioning of Tennessee's counsel. Similarly,
in Collins, the first circuit court opinion cited in Hood, the central
importance of the power to discharge a debt was stressed:
The power of bankruptcy courts to discharge debt is fundamental
to our bankruptcy system. If a state could assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid the effect of a discharge order, the bankruptcy system would be seriously undermined. A person owing
debts discharged by a bankdebts to a state could never have those
38
ruptcy court unless the state agreed.
Given the prominence of this issue in oral argument, the absence of
comparable statements of policy in Hood is surprising, but does not
foreclose the use of such policy considerations in later lower court
opinions. Such an absence probably reflects the inability of the Court
to agree upon any statement of policy, given its deep divisions on the
Eleventh Amendment. This continuing division within the Court was
reflected in Justice Souter's one sentence concurring opinion in which
save for any
Justice Ginsburg joined: "I join in the Court's opinion,
39
Tribe."
Seminole
in
holding
the
of
implicit approval
The narrowness of the opinion in Hood was mirrored in another
Eleventh Amendment opinion issued by the Supreme Court on the
same day, Tennessee v. Lane.40 In contrast to its earlier opinion in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

527 U.S. 706, 736-40 (1999).
290 U.S. 18 (1933).
Hood, 124 S. Ct at 1918 (quoting Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 (1933)).
Collins, 173 F.3d at 930.
Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1915.
124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
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Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,4 1 the Court in Lane upheld Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 42 However,
over the objections of four dissenting justices, Lane only addressed
Title II's applicability to providing access for the disabled to judicial
services. 43 It failed to address the constitutionality of Title II's applicability to other public services covered by Title II, which unlike providing individuals access to the courts, are not fundamental rights
44
under the Constitution.
The opinion in Lane also is noteworthy for its less rigorous application of the stringent evidentiary standard that the Court previously
had imposed in considering abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Garrettand other postSeminole Tribe opinions, such as Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,45 the Court repeatedly had
found that the legislative record did not evidence a sufficient pattern
of state violations! of constitutional rights to warrant abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the same legislative record deemed insufficient in Garrettto validate the abrogation of state sovereign immunity in Title I of the ADA
was found sufficient to validate the abrogation of state sovereign im46 ,47
munity in Title II in Lane.
Taken together the opinions in Lane and Hood reflect an obvious
stepping back from the :very aggressive expansion of state Eleventh
Amendment rights heralded by the Rehnquist Court in Seminole
Tribe. Opponents of a state's Eleventh Amendment rights involving
Article I powers, other than bankruptcy, will now seek to construct
their own exceptions to Seminole Tribe using Hood's in rem exception
as precedent. For example, in rem actions now are brought to protect
trademarks from domain name violations. 48
41. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to employment discrimination suits under Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act invalid).
42. Title II of the ADA bars individuals from being denied the benefits from programs, services or activities of a public entity, because of a disability. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982. The plaintiffs in Lane were two paraplegics, a criminal defendant and court stenographer, both of whom
claimed that their physical disabilities prevented them from gaining access to the courtroom. Id.
43. Id. at 1993.
44. Id. at 2004.
45. 527 U.S. 627, 645-47 (1999).
46. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999-00.
47. A lessening of the evidentiary standard was presaged in Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 2001).
The initial response to such an attempted expansion undoubtedly will be that admiralty and
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Finally, the Court's decision in Hood not to decide the abrogation
question means that the Sixth Circuit's opinion, which recognizes the
power of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity, remains good law. It also means that a rejection
of that understanding by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeal also remains intact, albeit on a possible
crumbling foundation. 49 But what does that acceptance or rejection
mean in light of the Court's opinion in Hood? The more broadly a
bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction is defined, the less need there is
for abrogation.
SOME LESSONS FROM

HoOD

Outside of the opinion itself, the most illuminating aspect of my
Supreme Court experience in Hood is the fact that I made it there.
Fourteen months after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seminole Tribe, I filed my first amicus brief in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals on behalf of the Business Bankruptcy Law Committee of the
New York County Lawyers' Association challenging the applicability
of the Seminole Tribe doctrine in bankruptcy. Ironically, it was a former assistant New York State assistant attorney general and judge,
Amy Juviler, who told me "stop complaining about Seminole Tribe,
and file an amicus brief." Never did I dream that I would be the attorney arguing the issue before the Supreme Court.
At the time that I started it was widely believed that the only way to
challenge Seminole Tribe was to assert that the Bankruptcy Code or at
least the Code provision at issue was enacted pursuant to Congress's
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. That was the only alternative that the Court stated was still available for the abrogation of a
state's sovereign immunity. By continuing to argue that Congress retained the power of abrogation under the Bankruptcy Clause, I received a very cool reception from almost everyone except my
colleagues at my firm and the New York County Lawyers' Associabankruptcy are specialized areas of the law with a long history of using in rem jurisdiction. See
Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1912.
49. See In re Nelson, 301 F.3d 820, 832 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1118-21
(9th Cir. 2000); In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); In re
Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 243-44 (5th Cir.), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997); In re
Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., 119 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1075 (1998). In each of these cases, other than Nelson, the circuit courts summarily
relied upon the applicability of the Seminole Tribe doctrine in bankruptcy. Interestingly, while
Nelson held that Congress lacked the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under the
Bankruptcy Clause, it recognized that a bankruptcy court may alter a state's legal rights by exercising its in rem jurisdiction, where applicable. Nelson, 301 F.3d at 837-38.
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tion, and those others who most mattered-the circuit court judges
before whom I argued. The willingness of the judicial system to consider what was perceived as a maverick view of the law is reflective of
an unparalleled openness, which is a tribute to our system.
Ultimately, the crucial factor in reaching the Supreme Court was
the publication of my article, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh
Amendment Immunity in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal. Although I had published numerous newspaper articles on the abrogation question prior to such time in the New York Law Journal, it
appears that the detailed analysis that a law review article allows and
the audience that the American Bankruptcy Law Journal reaches
were critical in giving the abrogation argument the needed prominence. It was immediately picked up by Judge Haines in his opinion
in In re Bliemeister50 and then by the bankruptcy judge and bankruptcy appellate panel in Hood.
Once the Court granted certiorariin Hood, the assistance provided
by the bankruptcy community in the form of amicus briefs and moot
courts were vital to the outcome of this case. It was paramount that
the Court realize that the application of the Seminole Tribe doctrine in
bankruptcy posed a major threat to the bankruptcy system's operation. A critical factor in making that argument was the presence of a
wide range of interests - consumers, business and academia - which
stood behind me. The breadth and acumen of their arguments were
invaluable.
Unless you have had prior experience before the Court, some guidance from seasoned Supreme Court practitioners is necessary. For
example, when you are briefing an issue for the Supreme Court, there
is much less of a need to describe the existing law - the members of
the Court are the people who made it. Also, particularly with respect
to the Eleventh Amendment, the Justices are the most knowledgeable
people in the world; what they are less knowledgeable about is the
workings of the bankruptcy system.
Also critical is the need to have your views challenged and refined
at a series of moot courts; I would recommend at least three. There
simply is no other way of anticipating the different points of view with
which you may be confronted at oral argument. In my case, the moot
courts ultimately convinced me to make the secondary argument in
my brief, a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction, the opening point in
my oral argument.
50. 251 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Az. 2000), affd on other grounds, 296 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2002).
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As it turned out, there was no need for me to have decided which
approach was best. The first question posed to Tennessee's counsel by
Justice O'Connor indicated that she was partial to recognizing an in
rem exception to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, and subse-

quent questions by other members of the Court generally suggested a
similar cast of mind. My job was simply to make the Court comfortable with that choice.
The Court decided in Hood to limit its virtually unqualified expansion of Eleventh Amendment immunity in Seminole Tribe to avoid

crippling the bankruptcy system. It chose to accomplish that goal by
adopting a traditional in rem view of bankruptcy court jurisdiction,
which allowed the Court to retreat from Seminole Tribe without any

explicit recognition of that change in its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in the opinion in Hood itself.
The decentralized nature of our legal system played a critical role in
providing the openness and flexibility, which allowed for the change
from Seminole Tribe. Now the system has the task of making workable the in rem exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity provided

in Hood. The decentralized character of our judicial system and the
multitude of issues which arise in bankruptcy means that the fulfill51
ment of this task will not be quick or simple.

51. In April of this year, after this article was written, the Supreme Court decided to take a
second look at the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Hood, when it granted certiorariin Cent. Va. Cmty.
College v. Katz, 125 S. Ct. 1727 (U.S. 2005). In the lower court opinion in Katz, the Sixth Circuit
simply adopted its sister panel's opinion in Hood. Katz v. Cent. Va. Cmty. College (In re Wallace's Bookstore), 106 Fed. Appx. 341 (6th Cir. 2004). In fact, Katz' attorneys filed an amicus
brief in Hood, when it was before the Supreme Court last year. Katz involves a preference
action, which would constitute a money judgment against a state. Chief Justice Rehnquist may
have concluded last year that it would be preferable to affirm Hood on a narrow in rem basis,
and then reassert the Seminole Tribe doctrine in the more hospitable context that Katz provides.
For example, at oral argument in Hood, the Chief Justice demonstrated the depth of his knowledge on the issue by planting this seed in anticipation of barring a bankruptcy court from using
in rem jurisdiction to hear a preference action against a state.
QUESTION: Well, before the Bankruptcy Act in 1978, bankruptcy courts couldn't try
voidable preferences. That had to be in the district court I believe.
MR. GERSON: That's correct, Justice Rehnquist.
2004 U.S. Trans LEXIS 16, *33, Hood (No. 02-1606).

